Who Sees What
Awazon market onion addresses
awazonloedcyl2otgftfg7qm6e2klbgg2dhouyli3hdno6gdkueh6byd.onion
awazonozc4jwyrveu4473igv5ldt2hnccl2s7lerm2z27cvrc22e4uyd.onion
awazonth6ocz5cyos63czmhtsglqr7ydkdcc4lopux7nxbauoo2qmvyd.onion

Printed exactly as supplied, in the order supplied, with no labels and no ranking between them. This site runs no checks against any of them. It publishes no uptime figure, no status light and no date of last checking, because it never looks. An address that opens is not by itself evidence of anything.

Turning on a bridge

A bridge is an entry point that is not on the public relay list. Switching to one changes a single fact for a single observer, and readers consistently expect it to change more.

Who sees it

Your ISP · The bridge operator · The wifi operator

Public Tor relays are published. That publication is deliberate and useful, and it has one side effect: anybody watching a line can compare the address you connected to against the list, and conclude that Tor is in use. Bridges exist because that comparison is a problem in places where the conclusion carries consequences.

A bridge does the same job as an entry relay. The difference is distribution. It is not on the published list, so the simple comparison fails. Some bridges also use a transport that changes how the connection looks on the wire, which is a further step in the same direction. This site describes the effect and does not walk through configuration.

What actually changes

Exactly one thing changes, and it changes for exactly one observer.

Your network observer no longer sees a connection to an address that appears on a public relay list. It sees a connection to some host. Depending on the transport, that connection may also resemble ordinary encrypted web traffic rather than something distinctive. The easy, cheap, automatic inference that Tor is in use no longer follows from the destination alone.

That is genuinely worth something. It is the difference between a record that answers a question and a record that does not. In an environment where connections to relays are blocked or flagged as policy, it is the difference between working and not working.

What does not change

Everything else. This list is longer than the one above and it is the reason the card exists.

Put bluntly: a bridge is a change to the first metre of a very long chain. If your concern lives further down that chain, it will still be there afterwards, unchanged and unaffected.

A bridge introduces a new operator

Somebody runs each bridge. That person or organisation now occupies the position an entry relay would otherwise hold, which means they see your connection arriving. That is a real party, added to your list, in exchange for removing a comparison your provider could make.

This is the same trade the catalogue keeps describing. Substituting observers is not the same as removing them, which is exactly the point made about borrowed wifi and about adding a VPN to Tor. In the bridge case the trade is usually a reasonable one, because the position is the same position an entry relay already had, and Tor is built on the assumption that the first hop knows where you are connecting from. What is not reasonable is treating the bridge operator as if they did not exist.

How much a first hop knows in general, bridge or not, is the subject of the entry guard. The short version is that the first hop knows your address and does not know your destination.

Why this card is placed here

A bridge is filed under your network rather than under Tor because the observer it affects is your network. Nothing about a bridge changes what any relay after the first one learns, and nothing about it changes what the market learns. It is a network level answer to a network level observation, and reading it as anything more is the error this card is trying to prevent.

What changes the answer

4 things change how much this action gives away. None of them takes it to zero, and none of them is a promise.

  1. Use a bridge for the reason bridges existBridges answer the specific problem of a network that blocks or flags connections to published relays. Used for that, they work as described. Used as a general privacy upgrade, they change nothing you were actually worried about.
  2. Count the bridge operatorAdding a bridge adds a party who sees your connection arrive. That is the cost side of the trade and it should be written down next to the benefit, not left off the list.
  3. Do not expect it to touch volume or timingThe two signals that survive encryption on your line survive a bridge too, in exactly the same form. Nothing in this section removes them.
  4. Keep the chain in viewThe seven observers page exists for this. A change at the first hop is one row in a table of seven, and the other six rows are unaffected.

What this card is not

This card is not a setup guide and does not tell you where to obtain a bridge. It describes what the change does to one observer and what it leaves exactly as it was.

Questions that come up

Does a bridge make me anonymous?

No. It changes what your network observer can infer from the destination of the first hop. Every other observer in the catalogue is unaffected.

Is using a bridge itself suspicious?

This site does not speculate about how any party interprets anything. Mechanically, the destination no longer matches a published list, which is the whole of the technical change.